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We explained to them that [we] assist the people in everyway to keep 
them out of trouble . . . and to show them that we were, actually, their 
friends . . . as long as they abided by the law, they didn’t have to 
have any fear [of] us . . . Of course, if they undertook to violate the law, 
we explained that we would have to deal with them severely.1 
During World War II, Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Special 
Detail officers visited Japanese families under the pretense of identi-
fying martial law violations and conducted informal investigations at 
their homes, extensively questioning residents. These visits were part 
of HPD surveillance of urban Japanese communities on O‘ahu that 
extended from preexisting concerns by military and civilian authori-
ties who feared the Japanese “threat” that was presumed to exist in 
neighborhoods where Japanese congregated in large numbers. Thus, 
these visits were not an aberration of martial law but replaced inves-
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tigations conducted by the prewar Espionage Bureau led by Captain 
John A. Burns, future Hawai‘i governor, who served as the liaison 
between military intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), and the HPD. Although Burns’s career in the HPD has been 
detailed in numerous historical accounts, the specific activities of 
Special Detail officers who worked with members of Burns’s Police 
Contact Group to identify and investigate certain individuals have not 
been fully examined.
Thus, the opening statement written in a report filed by Honolulu 
Police Department (HPD) officers Ernest Nowell and Eichi Hongo 
detailed a conversation Nowell and Hongo had with McCully resident 
Tadashi Yamashita on 12 August 1942 at his home after checking 
his compliance with short-wave radio regulations. For forty-five min-
utes, officers questioned Yamashita about his personal background, 
political sympathies, and the amount of war bonds he had purchased, 
explaining that it was his “feeling of cooperation that counted.”2 
Although Nowell and Hongo described these visits as part of their 
“Good Will tour” throughout Japanese neighborhoods in Honolulu 
to ensure the loyalty and security of residents, the underlying threat 
of non-compliance with martial law regulations challenges this char-
acterization.3 
Yamashita and his family, however, were not the only people 
HPD Special Detail officers called on, as police visited other Japa-
nese families under the pretense of identifying martial law viola-
tions and conducted informal investigations at their homes, exten-
sively questioning residents. While conducting regular police work 
such as citing traffic violations and preventing truancy, police also 
actively promoted Americanization efforts in the Japanese commu-
nity, suppressed rumors, and advocated the discarding of Japanese 
heirlooms. The personalized nature of surveillance by HPD Special 
Detail officers not only encouraged extreme demonstrations of loy-
alty in record war bond purchases, substantial blood donations, and 
ultimately voluntary military service, but in part also contributed to 
what scholar Yukiko Kimura described as a period of “extreme insecu-
rity” in wartime Hawai‘i.4 Although the police material that comprises 
part of the Romanzo Adams Social Research Laboratory collection 
that is the basis for this analysis is incomplete, it offers a revealing 
look into the police activities in 1942 that had significant implica-
internal surveillance of oahu’s japanese population   213
tions in the political future of Japanese Americans and the postwar 
career of Burns. 
Prewar Military Concerns of Japanese “Undesirables” 
Long before the outbreak of war, there was concern that the large 
number of Japanese in Hawai‘i posed a danger to territorial and 
national security, and this became one justification, among others, for 
the enactment of martial law and internment in Hawai‘i.5 To some, 
military control over the Islands was warranted by Hawai‘i’s strategic 
importance in the Pacific, an argument that was also recognized well 
before World War II. Due to this prevalent belief among military per-
sonnel—in particular among Army commanders—Hawai‘i was pre-
paring for war years before the Pearl Harbor attack. However, this 
was a war to be waged within Hawai‘i by the Army and other military 
forces, and they identified the enemy as local Japanese. Suspicions 
about Japanese loyalty and tractability had been earlier confirmed by 
Japanese labor activism in the 1909 and 1920 strikes, which the media 
portrayed as nationalistic activities by a distinctly un-American ethnic 
group who resisted assimilation efforts. Additionally, the involvement 
of Japanese defendants in two high-profile crimes—the Jamieson mur-
der and the Ala Moana case—seemed to reflect the threat Japanese 
posed to the white elite and military population. In 1928, a young 
Japanese man, Myles Fukunaga, kidnapped and murdered ten-year-
old Gill Jamieson, the son of affluent white parents. This crime, which 
sparked a community-wide manhunt for the perpetrator, allowed the 
latent fears of the Japanese to rise and pervade a public debate in 
the media. Widespread concern over the Japanese in Hawai‘i once 
more became a flashpoint in local and national news in the Massie 
case, when a young Japanese man, Shomatsu Ida, was among those 
accused of assaulting and raping the young wife of a navy officer in 
the Ala Moana case. Although Ida was found innocent of these allega-
tions, he was beaten and left for dead along a dirt road after a mistrial 
was announced. One of his Hawaiian companions, Joseph Kahaha wai, 
was later kidnapped and shot by white navy officers and the victim’s 
mother to ensure that “justice,” at least for whites, was administered. 
Collectively, these incidents raised anxieties about the large number 
of Japanese in Hawai‘i. 
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The U.S. Military and the Honolulu  
Police Department
When the Ala Moana assault trial ended in a mistrial on 6 Decem-
ber 1931, many members of the white community and the military 
regarded the decision as a miscarriage of justice. Criticism of the mis-
trial was widespread and bitter, as many perceived that whites could no 
longer be protected under the system of justice in Hawai‘i, which had 
once presumably privileged and protected them. The Navy Subcom-
mittee of the United States House of Representatives accused Judge 
Alva E. Steadman of delivering to the jury thinly veiled instructions to 
acquit the defendants.6 The Navy’s Admiral Yates Stirling, however, 
attributed the mistrial to the racial bias of the jury.7 
The naval hierarchy in the nation’s capital shared Admiral Stir-
ling’s conviction that the mistrial was a travesty of justice. Admiral Wil-
liam Pratt, chief of naval operations, sent a letter to the Navy Depart-
ment stating, “American men will not stand for the violation of their 
women under any circumstances. For this crime, they have taken the 
matter into their own hands repeatedly when they have felt that the 
law has failed to do justice.”8 The alleged rape of Thalia Massie and 
the resulting mistrial heightened pre-existing antagonisms between 
the military and the local population that now threatened to boil 
over and endanger Hawai‘i’s status as a territory of the United States. 
There were renewed calls for the imposition of martial law in Hawai‘i 
since it was seen as a place unsafe for white women and inimical to the 
Unites States military, despite the efforts of the territorial government 
to keep the publicity surrounding the trial as low key as possible.9 
Governor Lawrence M. Judd even asked Admiral Stirling to make an 
official denial of the rumors surrounding Hawai‘i as unfit for women, 
which he refused to do “until I could see some evidence that the rot-
ten police situation had been cleared up.”10 
In response to the negative publicity about Hawai‘i and to the 
calls for military rule following the not guilty verdict, the business 
leaders of Hawai‘i exerted pressure on Governor Judd to convene a 
special session of the legislature to remedy the perceived problems 
of the police department and law enforcement in general.11 When 
news broke of this development, the Hawaii Hochi, a prominent Japa-
nese newspaper, decreed that Hawai‘i and its citizens were now faced 
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with an ultimatum made at the “point of a gun by a little group of 
clever business men” such as Walter Dillingham: “Pass the Chief of 
Police Bill or have a commission form of government forced upon 
you.”12 Despite public outcry at this measure, which was rejected at 
the last meeting of the legislature as unnecessary, at its special ses-
sion in January 1932, the legislature considered reforming the police 
department, the public prosecutor’s office, the prison administration, 
and jury procedures. The police reform bill creating an appointed 
police commission quickly passed, and Governor Judd, with Senate 
approval, immediately named five business leaders as commission-
ers.13 This commission appointed Charles F. Weeber, who for ten years 
had been Dillingham’s “confidential man and Secretary” as chief of 
police.14 Under the commission, Honolulu’s police system was thor-
oughly reorganized, and William A. Gabrielson was brought in from 
California to be the permanent chief of police because local officers 
were perceived as incompetent. Despite the restructuring of the HPD, 
military concerns about the local population, that it was dominated 
by Japa nese, remained unabated. Throughout the 1930s, the mili-
tary conducted various investigations of the Japanese community and 
established military-civilian partnerships including the HPD to moni-
tor the internal Japanese threat. 
The Search for “Enemy Espionage and Sabotage”  
in the Japanese Community: The Police Espionage Bureau15
As early as 1935, the Army established the Army Service Command, 
which created a partnership between “civil control forces” and the 
military to prevent sabotage and local uprisings.16 The Army’s plan 
for civilian warfare in Hawai‘i also led to the creation of a paramili-
tary organization called the Provisional Police in July 1940. Led by 
plantation manager T.G.S. Walker, its mission was to prevent and sup-
press any emergency, such as “sudden and unpredicted overt acts by 
disloyal inhabitants.”17 Through the efforts of the Army, the Honolulu 
mayor, the chief of police, and plantation managers on O‘ahu, the 
Provisional Police was established to allow civilians to participate in 
defending Hawai‘i against possible attack. Throughout the fall and 
winter, plantation employees, members of the American Legion, and 
utility workers were trained in guard duty around the island. By April 
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1941, some 1,500 guards were ready for action; by May, more than 
one-third of them had participated in Army maneuvers.18 The idea 
was to free the regular militia from guard duty by utilizing plantation 
laborers who were familiar with local faces and terrain and could be 
efficiently managed and mobilized through Hawai‘i’s existing planta-
tion hierarchy.
In addition to the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
also became interested in looking for subversives within Hawai‘i’s 
Japanese community. In August 1939, just before war broke out in 
Europe, the FBI reopened its Honolulu office, which it had closed 
years earlier. FBI agents joined the efforts of Army and Navy intel-
ligence staffs, which had been compiling lists of anti-American sus-
pects, mainly those of Japanese ancestry. Together, they developed 
more detailed information regarding the Japanese population in 
the Islands, focusing surveillance on both the older group of 35,000 
aliens and the younger 120,000 Japanese Americans, many of whom 
held dual citizenship.
The FBI also gained the assistance of the HPD, which at the FBI’s 
request formed an Espionage Bureau. This entity was established in 
December 1940, following the approval of Police Chief Gabrielson, 
the mayor, and Board of Supervisors. The police bureau employed 
a Japanese, a Korean, a Hawaiian, and a “Hapa-Haole” ( Japanese-
White), all of whom spoke Japanese, to investigate matters for the FBI, 
Army, and Naval Intelligence to engage in undercover activities within 
Hawai‘i’s Japanese community. Police Captain John A. Burns served 
as the head of the Espionage Bureau from 1 January 1941 and was 
the liaison with certain Japanese who advised United States military 
and civilian intelligence bureaus on Japanese activities.19 Throughout 
1941, a total of 550 investigations were made by the Bureau with the 
majority of cases (86%) referred through the FBI.20 Much of what the 
Espionage Bureau did, Burns recalled, was in response to questions 
raised by the FBI about people’s background, general reputation, and 
activities to determine personal loyalties. Espionage Bureau person-
nel also examined general Japanese sentiments and potential racial 
tensions.21
Kanemi Kanezawa, a member of Burns’s staff at the Espionage 
Bureau recalled that their work was much different from regular 
police work. “The investigations,” Kanazawa pointed out, “were done 
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discreetly and indirectly . . . Our investigations were based upon sec-
ond- or third-hand hearsay evidence. It would never have stood up 
in a court of law.”22 However, these investigations were critical in the 
“Preparedness” of the HPD to counter a potential wartime emer-
gency.23 Thus, Gabrielson himself advocated that police departments 
should “have a record and also a cross index of all aliens so they could 
be apprehended on very short notice” during times of war.24 Although 
how the FBI utilized the evidence gathered by the Espionage Bureau 
is unknown, as relations between the United States and Japan dete-
riorated in 1941, demand for intelligence on the Japanese commu-
nity increased. Fortuitously for Burns, six months before the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, Japanese community leaders of the O‘ahu Citizen’s 
Committee for Home Defense called a public meeting at McKinley 
High School, where they proposed an organization of Japanese Amer-
icans to police the Japanese community in the event of war.25 The 
FBI and Chief Gabrielson agreed that such an organization was not 
acceptable. However, they did consent to an alternative proposal to 
create an organization called the Police Contact Group, a network 
of loyal Japanese Americans who would report regularly to the HPD 
through Burns.26 Gabrielson asked Burns to coordinate efforts and to 
submit names to the FBI for clearance. The first meeting was sched-
uled for Monday 8 December and canceled after the 7 December 
bombing of Pearl Harbor. 
However, one week before the attack, investigations into the Japa-
nese community had already begun. Burns recalled that Robert Shiv-
ers of the FBI called him into his office and with “tears in his eyes” 
confided that “we’re going to be attacked before the week is out.”27 
Burns reported that Shivers asked him to “try to see if you can get 
your men without letting anybody know it, see if there is any kind of 
signs in the community” of any “abnormal feeling” that would indi-
cate prior knowledge of the attack.28 According to Burns, he sent 
out four men under his command; despite “meeting ten or fifteen 
guys and observing their conversations” every day, “we found nothing 
that gave use any [hint]” of local collaboration.29 While Shivers never 
revealed the source of his information, before the week was out, his 
prediction came true. By noon, 7 December, mere hours after the 
Pearl Harbor attack, Burns was closeted in meetings with Shivers and 
Colonel George W. Bicknell, head of counterintelligence for the U.S. 
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Army in Hawai‘i. Together they went over lists of possible security risks 
and each of the three men had a vote. “If two of us voted yes,” Burns 
recalled, “he was a risk.” Burns noted that these individuals had been 
“completely investigated” partly through the efforts of the Espionage 
Bureau.30 Thus, as arrests began that day of suspected individuals 
in the community, HPD officers provided critical manpower. “I had 
asked the chief for one hundred cars and one hundred men when 
we went to start this pick up business,” Burns recalled. “So we gener-
ally had one policeman driving the car, or reserve policeman, one 
federal government guy . . . sometimes there were three” as suspects 
were arrested.31 Although some could argue that a selective infringe-
ment on the civil rights of certain individuals that was the basis of 
these arrests was a more reasonable response than the incarceration 
of the entire Japanese community in Hawai‘i, Burns’s own findings 
that “there would be no sabotage by the Japanese” contradicts the 
necessity of these actions.32
Within a week of the Pearl Harbor attack, federal authorities 
stopped consulting Burns and his Espionage Bureau about who 
should be interned; instead, they continued to use this unit to track 
down a number of rumors of evidence of Japanese disloyalty.33 None, 
however, led to any evidence of espionage. Yet, the Police Contact 
Group, which constituted “over fifty guys, scattered throughout the 
islands,” continued to be active throughout 1942.34 Burns noted that 
while the Group was “never organized,” it became a “hellauva good 
idea” because it became a good method of “getting information out 
where the paper didn’t get it, or didn’t put it rightly.”35 Burns added 
that it served a critical purpose of “quieting rumors down, because the 
boys who in one district would pick up that their people in that com-
munity got a big rumor they could call me, get the straight informa-
tion, and take it back and cut the rumor.” Besides promoting blood 
bank donations and war bond sales, Burns noted that it “furnished a 
very valuable asset on what’s going on in the community,” giving him 
evidence of Japanese loyalty while he simultaneously pushed for allow-
ing Japanese Americans entry into the armed services. However, in 
both his biography and oral history, Burns fails to note the police sur-
veillance of the Japanese community that continued at least through-
out 1942 that was in part based on the information obtained by his 
Police Contact Group.36 Additionally, from the Contact Group’s more 
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diligent workers came the leaders of the Emergency Service Commit-
tee, which served as the Morale Section of the Japanese community to 
spearhead various efforts to prove the loyalty of its members.
HPD Special Detail: A “Crime Prevention Agency” 
Operating in Japanese Communities 
In the days and weeks following the Pearl Harbor attack, the mili-
tary continued to monitor local sentiment. Within two hours after 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, military censors were installed at all com-
munication agencies. The Army and Navy censors handled civilian 
correspondence until February 1942; thereafter, mail censorship was 
done under the auspices of the Federal Office of Censorship, though 
it remained closely allied with the military and the military gover-
nor’s office. One responsibility of the censorship office was to moni-
tor morale in the Islands and compile bimonthly reports, which were 
furnished to Navy Intelligence and focused on topics such as “Racial 
Problems,” “War Worker Morale,” “Japanese Morale,” and “Interracial 
Friendships and Marriage” and quoted a selection of “typical com-
ments.” They also compiled statistical reports on the frequency with 
which issues were mentioned and on changes in the general tone of 
comments.37 
Although the censorship reports provide the voices and private 
opinions of thousands of anonymous individuals, FBI officials evi-
dently desired more specific knowledge of local Japanese attitudes 
and sentiment. On 8 January 1942, the FBI inaugurated a course of 
instruction in “civilian defense” for members of the HPD at Central 
Intermediate School. At opening ceremonies, Shivers explained to 
police executives the need for officers to receive FBI training. Accord-
ing to Shivers, “In this war the civilian populace is going to be guided 
by the man on the beat and by executives of the police department,” 
as HPD officers were encouraged to “guide” the civilian population 
through the tumultuous war period.38 In a fulfillment of this predic-
tion, a few months later a select group of police officers was charged 
with conducting “Special Detail” in neighborhoods in urban Honolulu 
and visiting island residents. One of seven designated police officers—
James Akana, Marcus Colburn, Neil Donahue, James Dulaney, Ansley 
N. Neptune, Ernest Nowell, and William G. Ross—joined bilingual 
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officer Eichi Hongo in daily patrols. In addition to enforcing black-
out restrictions as part of martial law, they handled traffic and curfew 
violations, arrested juvenile delinquents, raided gambling dens, and 
visited community bomb shelters. Reports were sent to Chief Gabriel-
son and Captain Dewey O. Mookini of the Patrol Division, and meet-
ings were also held in Burns’s office as officers recorded their daily 
activities and candid observations of life in Hawai‘i under martial law. 
As part of Special Detail, however, the officers’ responsibilities 
extended beyond regular patrols throughout O‘ahu neighborhoods. 
Describing themselves as a “Crime Prevention Agency,” rather than 
an “Enforcement Agency,” Special Detail officers explained that 
“our main purpose for patrolling . . . was because of the numerous 
Japanese residents” residing in neighborhoods like Liliha, Kaka‘ako, 
McCully­Mō‘ili‘ili, Kalihi, and Mānoa.39 According to the officers, the 
intent of these patrols was not to “pick on them or try to find fault 
with the people” but to “help them out in their misunderstandings 
and by our assistance, it would help to a great extent, in keeping them 
out of trouble.”40 Despite the innocuous description of their activities, 
the majority of police visits specifically targeted members of the Japa-
nese population living in ethnic communities who were previously the 
focus of military and FBI surveillance that had resulted in arrests and 
incarceration. Reports provided authorities with detailed information 
gained from these visits about the age, profession, wartime volunteer 
activities, and attitude about the occupants as well as other members 
of the household and extended family members.
In response to “numerous” queries whether officers could enter a 
person’s home without authorization, on 2 March 1942 provost Judge 
Lt. Col. Neal D. Franklin issued the following statement publicized in 
the Honolulu Advertiser : “Justice cannot wait now, under martial law for 
the formality of a search warrant. We don’t have time.”41 The urgency 
of Franklin’s statement was reflected in the actions undertaken by 
HPD Special Detail officers who used martial law regulations as a 
pretext for visiting Japanese homes and investigating the inhabitants. 
According to officers Neptune and Hongo, “as usual, we entered the 
houses with the pretense of checking the radios, and after ‘breaking 
the ice,’ we made them feel at ease and proceeded to explain our 
undertakings in that area.”42 In a report filed by Nowell and Hongo, 
they explained how their “Good Will tour” served a benign purpose to 
help people “become better Americanized.”43 
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While officers often conducted regular patrols interviewing resi-
dents door-to-door, they also resorted to subversive means of identify-
ing residences to visit. During their patrol of King Street in August 
1942, Nowell and Hongo described how they “soft footed it over 
fences and through back yards stopping from time to time” as they 
listened to personal conversations or for the illegal usage of radios.44 
When left alone to patrol the McCully area, Hongo mentioned how 
he “began my work by ‘snooping’ inbetween (sic) houses listening in 
to the conversation going on in houses” and later talked to residents 
“explaining my purpose in the area.”45
Although officers often traveled in pairs, Hongo was specifically 
charged with the task of explaining wartime regulations to Issei who 
did not speak English while his partner spoke to their Nisei children. 
While trying to “weed out” potential nationalistic sentiment within 
the Japanese community, the officers suggested to residents that “the 
First Aid Unit could always stand a few more volunteer workers, and 
also encouraged the donation of blood” to show their loyalty to Amer-
ica.46 In many instances, officers explained their activities in the con-
text of preventing potential criminal activity from occurring or from 
stopping criminal activity that was unknowingly being committed by 
Japanese residents during wartime.47 The “help” that the officers pro-
vided extended to not just personal visits to ensure compliance with 
martial law regulations, but personal exhortations of demonstrations 
of loyalty and support for Americanization efforts in their neighbor-
hoods. During their visits, they also encouraged residents to ensure 
that others adhere to regulations. While visiting Keisuke Nishi mura, 
officers Dulaney and Hongo “suggested to him that he should talk to 
his friends and neighbors in regards to our conversation, and should 
have them to cooperate in everyway with this Government, and to 
live and think like good Americans” by donating blood, purchasing 
defense bonds, and volunteering.48
“To promote friendship, good will, and Americansizm”:  
The Encouragement of Americanization49
During the course of their visits officers often prefaced their com-
ments with questions to determine the loyalty of Japanese residents 
such as “What would you do if the Enemy attacked this Island?” or 
“Would you, as an Enemy Alien, take part for them, or would you fight 
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them?”50 These types of questions echoed earlier interrogation ques-
tions FBI and military officials asked of Japanese internees as officers 
took special interest in promoting “Speak American” efforts. When 
Dulaney and Hongo visited Shigeko Yoshida and her neighbor Yukiko 
Tamaye in Mānoa following a suggestion from the Reverend Ernest 
S. Fujinaga, who felt “they needed a good talk from us,” the officers 
clearly expressed their condemnation of any pro-Japanese sentiment 
to these two housewives: “We flatly told them that any UnAmerican-
ized thinkings would absolutely not be tolerated. We told them that if 
they thought Japan was better we wanted them to get out; we didn’t 
want them here. They would only cause trouble for the loyal Japanese 
here.”51 However, if they “showed their utmost cooperation and did 
their bit,” they would be treated fairly. Thus, officers often encour-
aged Issei to attend English language classes and support volunteer 
activities. 
During their visits officers also inquired about the amount of war 
bonds purchased as indications of loyalty. When officers visited the 
house of Shimeki Masunari, they pointedly explained to Masunari 
that loyalty entailed action, not just words: “to be a good American 
did not necessarily mean to be born in America but, rather the atti-
tude taken in the purchase of war bonds and stamps, the working 
on vital war projects, and spirit in volunteer work, cooperating with 
the blackout and the General Orders.”52 Besides Masunari, other 
Japa nese residents were recipients of exhortations by the police who 
actively monitored and promoted war bond purchases among Japa-
nese families. In one particular instance, Dulaney and Hongo wrote 
an extensive report about a visit to the home of Shizuo Kimoto of 
Haoli Street, where they had a “friendly conversation” with his wife, 
Beatrice Yuki Kimoto.53 Dulaney and Hongo noted that although 
Kimoto “felt that it was their duty as good Americans to cooperate in 
every way with this Government to help win this War,” upon question-
ing her about her specific activities, officers observed that “she could 
show no proof that they were actually doing something to cooperate.” 
Dulaney and Hongo noted that although her husband was a defense 
worker making $1.25 an hour and that the family had $2460.86 in 
the bank, they had not purchased defense bonds. According to the 
officers, “This all led us to believe that they took no interest in the 
welfare of this Government.” Thus “we definitely let her know that 
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they should be ashamed of themselves for being so selfish, and sug-
gested that she start doing her bit,” attempting possibly to appeal to 
the Japanese value of haji or shame to encourage her compliance. 
After giving her a “good sales talk” about the benefits in investing 
in war bonds, the officers left after obtaining a promise by Kimoto 
to discuss purchasing war bonds with her husband. A month later, 
Dulaney and Hongo returned to the Kimoto residence to determine 
what progress had been made in complying with their suggestions. 
To their disappointment, they learned the family had purchased one 
$25 bond and planned to purchase only one a month. Despite the 
family’s explanation that they preferred to keep money in the bank in 
case of an emergency, the officers worked to convince the family that 
out of the $2000 they had in the bank they could at least invest half 
the amount in bonds. After giving them a “good talking to in regard 
to the necessity of their cooperation,” officers also suggested that they 
purchase defense bonds for their children.54
In contrast to the Kimoto family, Nowell and Hongo congratu-
lated Toshiko Mori of Pumehana Street, for purchasing $5000 worth 
of Defense Bonds for her and her Nisei children. Officers also com-
mended the actions of Keisuke Nishimura of Algaroba Street, who 
had led a group of about 400 in the collections of funds for the Vic-
tory Kit, visiting 800 homes and collecting $1200 in donations. They 
noted that two of his sons were block wardens, that everyone in his 
family had purchased defense bonds, and that Nishimura “partici-
pated in the collection of all Japanese literature that were turned in 
at the [outbreak] of the War and headed the group in the McCully 
District.”55 While Kimoto and Nishimura’s actions reveal their com-
mitment to the American government, their activities could also 
reflect efforts to deflect criticism from the police, who promoted the 
purchase of war bonds to a degree that has not been acknowledged. 
The Suppression of Rumors
Besides promoting Americanization efforts within the Issei popula-
tion, police officers also actively sought to suppress rumors that were 
rampant in Hawai‘i. Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
the Espionage Bureau investigated rumors that proliferated in the 
Islands, such as the rumor that Japanese plantation workers had cut 
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arrows in the cane fields to direct Japanese pilots to Pearl Harbor or 
had set cane fires as signals. Others had heard that Japanese pilots 
who had been shot down were found with McKinley High School 
and University of Hawai‘i rings, implying they were former residents 
of Hawai‘i.56 Newspapers reported that Japanese parachutists had 
landed on O‘ahu and that the city water supply had been contami-
nated, along with other general acts of sabotage.57 In addition to 
rumors surrounding the Japanese community, internally the Japanese 
community faced great anxiety about their future as literally over-
night 1,444 Japanese—of whom 979 had Japanese citizenship and 
525 were American citizens, though mostly Kibei, or those educated in 
Japan—were interned.58 Rumors became particularly rampant as Issei, 
many of whom had only a limited grasp of English, were cut off from 
traditional means of information following radio restrictions that pro-
hibited Japanese news programs and the closing of Japanese-language 
newspapers. On 24 October 1942, after a meeting in Burns’s office, 
Dulaney and Hongo went to Kaheka Lane to investigate a rumor that 
originated in the area in regard to the Japanese people having to evac-
uate, as they were allegedly being sent to the mainland. Although the 
officers reported that people there had not heard of the rumor, they 
made a special effort to suppress it through individual conversations. 
They also contacted Kazuo Watanabe, Burns’s contact man for lower 
Mānoa, to relay to others that the rumor was untrue.59 
A few weeks later on 10 December, officers were dispatched to the 
Kalihi district to respond to rumors of the dangers of blood donations 
after a “Mr. Matsumura” had died four hours after donating blood.60 
Following Matsumura’s death, members of the Kalihi football team 
refused to donate blood. Officers spent days talking with people, 
assuring the safety of donating blood. According to an explanation 
Dulaney and Hongo provided to Noka Shimabukuro, we “informed 
him that [Matsumura’s] death was not because he had donated blood, 
but was due to the reaction of the blood vessels after the queer feel-
ing, or shock, that took place after he donated his blood.”61 Although 
they assured Shimabukuro and others that “there were hundreds of 
others who had donated their blood and had never died,” they also 
added, “Even if he had died from donating his blood, he was dying for 
his Country, and they, as well as everyone else, should make up their 
minds to die for this Country, anyways. It would be a worthwhile death, 
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we explained.” This type of extreme patriotism expected of Japanese 
residents, though likely exaggerated, was actively promoted by HPD 
officers who also sought to eliminate the “Pro-Japanese” threat by the 
eradication of elements of Japanese culture.62 
Japanese House Cleaning
Besides investigating bond purchases, addressing rumors, and pro-
moting English-speaking efforts, officers carefully observed the inte-
riors of residences during their visits and encouraged individuals to 
remove Japanese objects and heirlooms to prevent potential accusa-
tions of disloyalty. Some, such as Helen Shizano Tokuda of South King 
Street, voluntarily removed or destroyed Japanese cultural artifacts 
before the arrival of the police. When police officers came to visit her 
home, she shared a photo album of a trip to Japan a younger sister had 
taken in 1939 that contained only sightseeing photos. Tokuda also 
revealed to officers that “about two months after the war they found a 
Japanese flag that their mother had. They immediately burned [it].”63 
When police visited the McCully home of Keisuke Nishimura, they 
noted the presence of “several articles in their living room that were 
from Japan, such as bird [miniature] statues, [miniature] houses, 
etc.” After talking to Nishimura about the importance of abiding by 
existing laws and supporting the war effort, “We suggested to them 
that anything they had use for they should keep, but if such things as 
books, etc., were not going to be used, they should do away with.”64 
While Tokuda voluntarily engaged in these actions before the arrival 
of the police as a demonstration of her loyalty to America, she possibly 
might have engaged in these actions to prevent the scrutiny to which 
police subjected the Nishimura home. 
As two Japanese authors observed during this period, “The Japa-
nese people at present are subjected to criticism from all sides; every 
move made by them is observed keenly by the community, and any 
false move is severely criticized.”65 While the origins of this criticism 
have been identified broadly in the context of addressing the entire 
Japanese community, the actions of the police reveal a specific target-
ing of people in their neighborhoods and homes to ensure commu-
nity compliance. 
Thus, upon visiting the home of Takeo Muraoka of Upper Mānoa 
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Road, Dulaney and Hongo noted “the bad condition of the home 
and the 2 Japanese Shrines they had. In this regard, we suggested to 
her that she put same away if she really did not need it.” According 
to the officers, “It only tended to create an impression of Japanese 
Ideals on their part.”66 Although the impact of the officers’ advice is 
not known, the officers clearly felt it was their responsibility to encour-
age the eradication of Japanese items from households. As such, resi-
dents in the Sheridan district reported that “they had been turning 
the house inside out trying to look for, and get rid of, unlawful things. 
All pictures, books, they disposed of by burning.”67 Additionally, offi-
cers noted that, in a reversal of generational roles, “even the sons and 
daughters of the Aliens came over to instruct the parents in the law 
and in getting rid of anything unlawful.”
This transformation of the home was also carried out in the larger 
Japanese community as following the Pearl Harbor attack, the physi-
cal landscape of Hawai‘i was dramatically altered. Previously, the Issei 
had openly embraced their Japanese culture in ethnic enclaves like 
Mō‘ili ‘ili and ‘A‘ala, where visitors to the Islands would have been 
amazed at the “old world customs” openly practiced by the Japanese: 
Issei read the news in two large daily Japanese newspapers, the Nippu 
Jiji and Hawaii Hochi, and sent their children to Japanese language 
schools.68 Japanese theaters such as Nippon Kan and Honolulu Za 
showed the latest films from Japan, and both Issei and Nisei sang 
 Japanese songs they learned through Japanese radio programs and 
from records available locally. 
After 7 December, however, the familiar physical landscape of the 
Japanese community was radically transformed with the closure of 
Bud dhist temples, Japanese language schools, and Japanese news-
papers and radio stations and the incarceration of priests, teachers, 
and businessmen. As Naval Commander John Ford noted, “They 
have all taken down their signs and have substituted English lettering. 
For example; ‘Banzai Café’ . . . is now the ‘Keep ‘Em Flying Café.’”69 
Numerous businesses removed Japanese signage, began selling more 
Western products, and offered American forms of entertainment. 
Two Japanese writers observed this transformation during the war: 
“Today, no one dreams of going to a Japanese movie. Instead, they 
have turned to American movies. Aged Issei couples are frequently 
seen toddling into a jammed theater where Hedy Lamar and Spencer 
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Tracy are being flashed on the screen.”70 While the transformations 
were voluntary, these changes in the Japanese community reflected 
the deep anxieties of the Issei who feared incarceration.
The response of many Issei to this dramatic change was one of 
“retiring”—withdrawing from public life. The loss of organized com-
munity activities, traditional leaders, and social continuity meant “the 
loss of the guidance on which they had depended in defining the 
situation of everyday life.”71 As one Issei explained, “We are afraid. We 
don’t know what to do. Even our own children don’t let us go out. If 
we go out, we will be the focus of hate and revenge. So we stay in the 
house.” Even in their own homes, the Issei were not immune to the 
changes sweeping through Hawai‘i as the private or family sphere was 
transformed in part through efforts of the police.
Personal Investigations and Intimidation:  
Fear of the Police
This transformation of the physical environment of Hawai‘i’s Japa-
nese communities and homes and the upending of traditional gen-
erational roles that was facilitated by police visits sparked further mis-
trust of officials by many Japanese. However, according to special duty 
officers, many residents appreciated the efforts of the police and their 
“goodwill” visits, Taro Tasaka of Kapi‘olani Boulevard for example, 
who initially “held back the fear she had inside of her.”72 But, “after 
talking to her in Japanese and making her feel at ease,” she was so 
relieved that she “broke down, expressed her previous emotions, and 
showed her gratitude by thanking us with tears in her eyes.” To the 
officers, “such an [incident] as this really shows what good results we 
can obtain by treating people with Kindness—applying the ‘golden 
rule’—regardless of Citizen or Alien.” Thus, officers understood 
their actions as benevolent outreach into the Japanese community to 
smooth racial differences and encourage Americanization. 
Despite the positive perspective HPD officers presented about their 
actions, there were a number of instances that indicated residents’ 
fear of police visits. When investigating short wave reception noises at 
Wiliwili Street, Dulaney and Hongo took the opportunity to question 
the occupants, Shinichi and Muichi Shimamura. According to the 
police report filed that day, “We first asked the former whether they 
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had ever listened to Japan. He immediately replied ‘No!’”73 Dulaney 
and Hongo noted that “he was rather afraid of policemen so we told 
him that he did not have to fear us.” Despite these reassurances, Shi-
mamura continued to be cautious in his responses to the police. 
As officers encouraged residents to speak to others about their visits 
and be “good samaritans” by complying and adhering to the law some 
possibly apprehensively awaited an unannounced visit by the police.74 
Kamado Uyehara of Fern Street, for example, mentioned to officers 
that “after receiving information that the Police were checking that 
district, he wondered why we had not checked his home earlier. He 
stated he had been expecting our call everyday in the past.”75 Others 
seemed overly anxious about the officers’ visit and likely prepared 
well in advance. Nowell and Hongo noted that Torahichi Suzuki of 
Date Street “wanted so much to be with the Law, that he insisted, to 
a point of irritation, that we check his house thoroughly” to ensure 
compliance with blackout measures.76 A group of Issei also noted that 
they all retired into their homes after 8:00 p.m. because they were 
afraid of being arrested.77
While officers reported that many of the residents were grateful 
for their visits, others were less than receptive to their efforts. When 
visiting Rinji Takakawa, officers noted that “he held back and didn’t 
express his thoughts freely. We had to do most of the talking.”78 
Besides recalcitrance, others were more open in their displeasure 
of police intrusion in their homes. When Dulaney and Hongo ques-
tioned Takakawa about a large radio that was reportedly brought to 
the home, they noted that his daughter, Joan, “did not like our intru-
sion and resented, very much, our checking the place. She later left 
the room, crying, due to being scared, we presume.”79 Despite the 
sensitivity the officers tried to demonstrate in these visits, the officers 
became upset at her reaction, stating, “We let her know, definitely, 
that we did not visit them just for the fun of it, but rather because it 
was a necessity, and if were going to be sarcastic, we could make a very 
bad report about her.” Although the officers explained that “since we 
did not locate anything in violation of the law, it was for their good,” 
thereby appeasing her worries, “we let her know that she shouldn’t 
take the attitude she had at that time.”
Although officers dismissed the younger Takakawa’s response to 
their visit, many Japanese residents were aware that visits by the police 
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that were motivated by accusation of disloyalty could serve as the basis 
for arrest and incarceration. On 5 August 1942, officers responded to 
a complaint by William Pattison of Lime Street, who claimed that his 
neighbor, Harry K. Teruya, “had always been listening to shortwave 
and that he had heard same frequently.”80 Although no violations 
were found, officers cautioned the residents in the surrounding area 
about the volume as well as the “Propagandic nature of the Enemy 
broadcasts” and continued to patrol the area.81 Officers also encour-
aged the owner of the Okumura store on East Mānoa Road to inform 
them to relay to any “Pro-Japanese” they might know that “those were 
the type of people we were anxious to meet, to convince them [to 
become] good Americans,” and if they still harbored anti-American 
sentiment, the police would deal with them “severely.”82
The most revealing example of fear of the police occurred when 
police visited Teruko Sokabe of Ka‘aloa Street. Early in 1942, police 
officers asked Sokabe, whose husband Miyuki had been interned, to 
make a written statement to the police “in regard to her feelings as 
to this present situation—her opinion of Japan, where she was born, 
and the U.S. where she was reared.”83 According to officers, this state-
ment was “for the purpose of letting others know the true feelings of 
the Japanese Aliens residing here, that is their loyalty for this Govern-
ment.” Although officers mentioned that writing this statement was 
“not compulsory, but voluntary,” and for the benefit of other Issei, 
Sokabe evidently felt otherwise. The following day, Sokabe went to 
the Swedish consulate, as she “felt that we were trying to incriminate 
her.” She further stated that “she didn’t know what it was all about.” 
According to Dulaney and Hongo, Sokabe had taken the “wrong atti-
tude,” and although they felt they were “trying, in every way, to help 
her, she did not trust us and led us to have no faith in her.” Burns was 
alerted to this case and the officers were once more sent to her home 
on 15 December 1942 to resolve this situation, but Sokabe remained 
undecided about the situation. 
Although police officers regarded Sokabe as a “foolish woman,” 
the activities of the police did not inspire confidence or trust by some 
members of the population. Sokabe and others had their husbands 
interned and visits by the police often followed earlier visits by FBI 
and military officials who had taken their husbands away.84 On other 
occasions, officers were more sensitive of the plight of wives and fam-
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ily members of internees. While officers were suspicious of the “very 
large safe and an abundance of Japanese books” at the residence of 
Iwako Koike, at the time of their visit Koike was entertaining guests 
and “we did not want to embarrass her any further by questioning her 
in the presence of her visitors.”85 They planned to visit her later, as “we 
believed that we had to handle her in a very delicate manner because 
any harsh undertakings on our part would certainly result in her hav-
ing a bad feeling for [this] Government.” The officers’ comments 
revealed their own awareness of the plight of the families of internees 
who officials earlier visited; they justifiably feared future police visits 
as their loved ones had been taken away without any explanation. 
Collaboration and Internal Community Surveillance: 
Contact Men and the Emergency Service Committee
While police did likely rely upon army and navy intelligence to identify 
possible subversive elements in the Japanese community, explaining 
in part why certain families were visited by both federal and local offi-
cials, officers regularly met with Burns to discuss the progress of their 
work. Additionally, Burns’s contact men encouraged officers to visit 
certain individuals. Although no official sanction was secured, starting 
on 14 January 1942 a group of district leaders who had been chosen 
in November 1941 came into the office of Burns “four or five Contact 
men at a time” to discuss “setting at peace the minds of the people 
and the educational feature” of the visits.86 Police reports mention sev-
eral contact men who were specifically identified with providing sup-
port and intelligence to Burns and the police department to ensure 
the loyalty of the Japanese community under martial law: “Mr. [Kiyo-
tsuchi] Suehiro” (Mō‘ili‘ili), Harry K. Masuda (Kalihi), “Mr. Fuji kawa” 
(Kaka‘ako), the Reverend Ernest S. Fuji naga (Upper East Mānoa); 
Kazuo Watanabe (Lower Mānoa Section), “Mr. Kosasa” (Kaimukī), 
Nelson Kawakami (Pālama), and James K. Fujioka (Kaheka Lane). 
These men comprised a small number of the forty-three Contact 
Group members who were responsible for neighborhoods in Hono-
lulu alone; twenty-seven others were responsible for other districts 
around O‘ahu, including ‘Aiea, Waipahu, Hale‘iwa, and Kailua.87 
Police particularly praised the efforts of Fujinaga, who had assumed 
a leadership role in the Japanese community and assisted American-
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ization efforts. According to Dulaney and Hongo, many in the com-
munity had “a great deal of confidence” in Fujinaga due to his efforts 
to install streetlights and his implementation of a correct house num-
bering system in the area.88 Following the outbreak of war, Fujinaga 
encouraged women to volunteer for Red Cross work, gathered men 
to volunteer for Army Engineer work and other projects, obtained 
gasoline coupons for gardeners, and took care of the tire requisitions. 
Police noted his efforts to promote blood donations and the selling 
of $9,000 worth of bonds, and encouraged Issei residents to attend 
Fuji naga’s English language classes. Additionally, Fujinaga provided 
names of people whom the police should visit, people he “felt needed 
a good talking to due to their being more Pro-Japanese, rather than 
American.” On one occasion, he specifically encouraged officers to 
visit Mr. Okubo, Mr. Ueno, and Mr. and Mrs. Sumida of Upper Mānoa 
Road.89 Other contact men like Kazuo Watanabe engaged in efforts 
to speak to different businessmen around town to promote Ameri-
canism, obtained passes from the military governor for Issei going to 
early Kiawe Corps work, and similarly encouraged blood donations, 
the purchase of war bonds, and Red Cross volunteer work. 
Given the interests of the Police Contact Group, unsurprisingly it 
was part of the Emergency Service Committee (ESC), an organiza-
tion composed primarily of Nisei who sought to prove the loyalty of 
the Japanese community in Hawai‘i during World War II. During the 
war, the Committee promoted racial unity by spearheading a “Speak-
American” campaign, organizing blood drives and the purchase of 
$147,408.75 in war bonds in 1942 alone, and collecting funds for 
the Red Cross and the Army and Navy Emergency Relief Societies—
activities that coincided with police efforts to promote loyalty within 
the Japanese community.90 Thus, police were also directed to cer-
tain homes by Shigeo Yoshida, a leading organizer of the ESC who 
had been a visitor when police arrived at the home of Iwako Koike.91 
Yoshida not only asked officers for clarification of policies related to 
Issei visits but encouraged officers to contact by telephone twenty-
two-year-old Thomas Toyofuku of Lot 2 lower Oili Road, whose father 
had been interned. Toyofuku had tried to volunteer for the armed 
forces but had been rejected because of his dual citizenship. Yoshida 
requested that officers “go to see whether we could straighten him 
out,” as he was evidently discouraged.92 Nowell and Hongo told Toyo-
232   the hawaiian journal of history
fuku to “keep his chin up and make the best of everything, for him-
self and for his family,” and encouraged him to seek them out if he 
or his family needed assistance. While Yoshida’s suggestion was likely 
driven by personal concern for Toyofuku, his actions show the close 
collaboration that existed between Nisei leaders and civil and military 
authorities to ensure the loyalty of the Japanese community. 
While some may have appreciated the efforts of members of the 
Police Contact Group and the ESC, others in the Japanese commu-
nity were not receptive to these efforts.93 Some members of the Japa-
nese community referred to ESC and Police Contact Group members 
and Burns himself as inu [dogs] and accused them of trying to win 
favoritism by cooperating with the government as they were regarded 
as “patriotic zealots” and “self-appointed stool pigeons” for the mili-
tary authorities.94 In the mainland incarceration camps, allegations 
of “informer” and “collaborator” used to identify alleged inu sparked 
beatings and riots at Poston and Manzanar; one incident resulted in 
two deaths and nine wounded.95 In Hawai‘i, similar violent incidents 
did not occur but the use of the word inu suggests that some did not 
fully embrace the Americanization efforts to prove the loyalty of the 
Japanese community. Possibly these efforts prevented the mass incar-
ceration of the Japanese population and became the basis for the 
postwar activism of Hawai‘i’s Democratic Party and Nisei politicians 
who had ties with the ESC and Burns. 
Still today, discussion of the motivations of inu and cooperation 
with or resistance against authorities remains a sensitive topic in the 
Japanese community, especially in Hawai‘i, where the matter has yet 
to be fully addressed particularly in understanding the action of the 
members of the Police Contact Group and Burns’s role in the HPD. 
Proof of the loyalty of the Japanese community came at a very high 
price, especially for those whose homes and privacy were invaded by 
interrogating police officers, contributing in part to the atmosphere 
of fear and anxiety that infused many Japanese communities and resi-
dences during the war. 
Conclusion
The actions of HPD officers during World War II, which have not 
been examined in the dominant literature, offer critical insights into 
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the experiences of Japanese in Hawai‘i living under martial law—men 
and women military and civilian authorities extensively investigated 
throughout 1942. However, these investigations that took place in pri-
marily Japanese neighborhoods and homes were not an aberration of 
martial law but a product of the long history between the HPD, FBI, 
and military intelligence, as they had examined the Japanese “threat” 
for years. Additionally, the invasiveness of these investigations suggests 
possible questions about the effectiveness of selective incarceration 
in controlling the remaining population in Hawai‘i. Authorities evi-
dently believed a threat still existed that necessitated police visits into 
Japanese neighborhoods. Those investigated, however, were from 
much different social strata than the educational, religious, political, 
and economic leaders who had been interned, indicating that all Jap-
anese were suspect by virtue of their race. 
It is important to note that the close collaboration between the 
HPD and FBI, who shared and acted on espionage intelligence, was 
partly made possible through John A. Burns, who facilitated intelli-
gence gathering on the Japanese community through the Espionage 
Bureau and later the Police Contact Group. Additionally, during the 
war, Burns worked with both the Police Contact Group and the ESC 
members to promote Americanization efforts and the loyalty of the 
Japanese. Members of the Police Contact Group met regularly with 
Burns, who encouraged officers to visit certain individuals on their 
recommendation. Burns attended ESC meetings to assist in coordina-
tion efforts to mobilize the Japanese community—efforts that were 
carefully organized to reduce questions about Japanese loyalty. In 
effect, Burns ushered in a new leadership role for the Nisei, who were 
granted new status with the arrest and incarceration of traditional 
leaders. Their English-language skills and ability to communicate 
effectively with authorities also gave them a critical advantage over 
the remaining Issei, who became a silent generation with admonitions 
to “Speak American.” 
Thus, the significance of these findings of the activities of the police 
goes beyond the recognition of the infringement of personal rights 
and the creation of an atmosphere of anxiety and fear in the Japanese 
community among those who had not been arrested or interned. The 
contributions of Burns and Americanization efforts of the Japanese 
community that were supported by organizations like HPD, the Police 
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Contact Group, and ESC have often been understood positively, as they 
created a new future for the Japanese community through their dem-
onstrations of loyalty both at home and on the battlefields of World 
War II. As Burns’s biographers, Dan Boylan and T. Michael Holmes 
noted, “To understand Jack Burns’s postwar political base, it is nec-
essary to examine the relationships he developed during the war.”96 
Yet these relationships and implications for certain members of the 
Japanese community should be critically examined as developing from 
long-standing fears and suspicions of the Japanese. Possibly these wide-
spread demonstrations of loyalty like bond purchasing, blood dona-
tions, and extensive volunteer work were not simply spontaneous ges-
tures that emerged organically from felt beliefs of loyalty to America; 
they were actions that the police and a select group of self-appointed 
individuals within the Japanese community closely monitored and 
promoted. Ultimately, members of the ESC and Nisei veterans whose 
military participation Burns supported in 1942 would form the basis 
of the Democratic Party and Burns’s successful political campaign 
to become governor of Hawai‘i. Thus, while some established their 
reputation during World War II through their efforts to mobilize the 
Japanese community by cooperating with authorities, others became 
targets of police visits to ensure compliance with military and civilian 
orders revealing the collusion of internal and external interests. 
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